IOT, ICS & HARDWARE SECURITY
Attack Surface · UART / JTAG / SPI · Firmware · Embedded Web · BLE / Zigbee / RF · ICS & SCADA · Modbus / DNP3 · IoT Botnets · Defence
The IoT and ICS Attack Surface
- IoT/ICS devices trade security for cost, longevity and physical exposure — unpatched and often credential-weak
- Attacks span six layers: hardware, firmware, local services, radio, industrial control, and internet-scale botnets
- Availability and physical safety dominate ICS — you cannot just reboot and retry on a live plant
- Only ever test hardware you own, on an isolated bench — never touch a live industrial or medical system
Everything with a chip and a network connection is now a target: a smart doorbell, a factory sensor, a hospital infusion pump, a city water valve. These devices were often built for cost and convenience, not security, and many sit in networks nobody patches. This module is about understanding that world well enough to break into a test device in your own lab — and, far more importantly, to defend the ones that matter.
Look at the prepaid token meter on an estate wall — the one you top up with a 20-digit code from M-Pesa. It is a tiny, cheap computer bolted outdoors that controls something physical: your power or water. Nobody updates it for 15 years, anyone can walk up and touch it, and the engineer's default code is often still set. That is the whole story of IoT and ICS security: small computers, built cheap, living in the open, running something real. Break the token meter's brain and you are not just crashing an app — you are turning the estate's water on and off.
Why IoT and ICS Are Different
| PROPERTY | WHY IT MATTERS FOR SECURITY |
|---|---|
| Long lifespans (10–25 yrs for ICS) | Devices run unpatched, unsupported OSes long after flaws are public |
| Physical access is common | An attacker can hold the hardware: open it, solder to it, read its chips |
| Weak or hardcoded credentials | Default admin/admin and baked-in backdoor accounts are rampant |
| Minimal update mechanisms | Many devices cannot be patched at all, or only via risky manual flashing |
| Safety + availability first | In ICS, a crash can stop a turbine or a pump — you cannot just "reboot and test" |
| Obscure protocols | Modbus, DNP3, BLE, Zigbee — often with no authentication or encryption by design |
The Layers You Can Attack
Think of an IoT device as a stack, each layer a different discipline you will meet in this module:
| LAYER | EXAMPLE ATTACK | CHAPTER |
|---|---|---|
| Hardware | Solder to a UART header, drop into a root shell | Ch 2 |
| Firmware | Extract the flash, find hardcoded keys and backdoors | Ch 3 |
| Local services | Exploit the embedded web UI or API | Ch 4 |
| Radio | Sniff and replay BLE / Zigbee / sub-GHz RF | Ch 5 |
| Industrial control | Enumerate and understand PLCs over Modbus/DNP3 | Ch 6–7 |
| The internet | IoT malware recruiting devices into botnets | Ch 8 |
Practise only on hardware you own and on protocols in an isolated bench network. ICS especially: never scan, probe, or send traffic to a live industrial or medical system. The wrong packet to a real PLC can stop a physical process and hurt people. Everything advanced in this module assumes a lab PLC or a simulator — never production.
- IoT/ICS devices trade security for cost, longevity and physical exposure — unpatched and often credential-weak
- Attacks span six layers: hardware, firmware, local services, radio, industrial control, and internet-scale botnets
- Availability and physical safety dominate ICS — you cannot just reboot and retry on a live plant
- Only ever test hardware you own, on an isolated bench — never touch a live industrial or medical system